Crypto has lost $26.9 billion to hacks since 2017 while generating $47 billion in on-chain revenue, a ratio of 57 cents stolen for every dollar earned.
The figure comes from Lorenzo Valente, director of research at ARK Invest, who compared Token Terminal revenue data for 27 of the largest crypto projects with hack losses tracked by DefiLlama from 2017 to the present. The annual shape of the two lines is the argument: from 2021 onward projects generally earned more than attackers took, but the cumulative gap never opened wide enough to absorb a single bad year.
2020 was the extreme. The industry earned about $1 billion and lost $4 billion, and the same inversion held through 2018 and 2019. Then revenue expanded faster than losses: $12.5 billion earned against $2.9 billion stolen in 2021, about $4.6 billion against $1.6 billion in 2023, roughly $9 billion against $1.7 billion in 2024, and $8.9 billion against $2.7 billion in 2025.
2026 has broken the pattern. Hackers have taken $8.7 billion so far, the worst year on record, with the $6.3 billion stolen from Binance at the end of October accounting for most of it. On-chain revenue is estimated at about $5.6 billion for the year, which puts losses ahead of everything the sector earned.
The Binance breach shows where the money went. The exchange said an attacker may have used a compromised DevOps engineer’s laptop to reach a service container and submit unauthorised withdrawals. Co-CEO Richard Teng later added that it was not a single “one-click” action and that the company found additional points of breach. Of the $6.3 billion taken, blockchain partners including Tether and Circle froze about $3 billion on-chain, most of it in stablecoins. Binance said it absorbed the financial impact through its SAFU fund, corporate treasury and related reserves, and withdrawals resumed in phases from November 1.
The FBI, working with security firms, attributed the theft to a group it calls TraderTraitor, which it links to North Korea. Pyongyang rejected the accusation and accused Washington of political provocation, suggesting the United States would be the main beneficiary if the funds were recovered and added to its strategic reserve.
The ratio is a crude instrument. It compares protocol revenue with losses that fall on users, exchanges and bridges, which are not always the same parties, and a single nine-figure breach can swamp a year of earnings. But it makes a point the industry tends to make quarterly and forget: on this data, security spending is still cheaper than the alternative.