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Blockchain Technology

Gonka AI Bridge Key Compromise Lets Attacker Mint Unbacked Tokens and Drain $1.06M

The attacker changed the rotating validator-set key that approves withdrawals, then emptied the bridge's stablecoin reserves and minted tokens with nothing behind them.

Gonka AI, a decentralised network for artificial intelligence compute, lost roughly $1.06 million after an attacker took control of the key that authorises withdrawals from its Ethereum bridge.

According to onchain analytics firm Onchain Lens, the attacker gained access to the bridge’s BLS group key, which let them pull $884,800 in USDT and USDC from the bridge’s stablecoin reserves and issue $172,000 of Wrapped Gonka tokens without locking the corresponding assets on Gonka’s native chain.

The mechanics follow the project’s own documentation. Moving funds from Gonka to Ethereum requires signatures from the network’s validator set, and those signatures are checked against a BLS group key that rotates with every network epoch. By changing the epoch key on the bridge, the attacker effectively took over the component that decides which withdrawals are valid.

Blockchain security firm Blockaid flagged the activity while it was still in progress and put the loss at about $1.05 million across roughly five transactions at the time of its initial alert. The two firms’ figures differ slightly but describe the same sequence.

The funds were routed through the Uniswap decentralised exchange and a series of wallets, which makes the final destination harder to trace and complicates any recovery effort.

The unbacked token issuance is a second problem layered on the first. Wrapped Gonka is meant to represent assets held on the Gonka chain. Tokens minted without that backing can circulate as if they were redeemable, and anyone who acquired them after the exploit is holding a claim the bridge cannot honour.

Bridge key management has been the recurring failure point in cross-chain exploits, and this incident fits the pattern: the contract logic was not broken so much as the authority to approve withdrawals was captured. For smaller networks that rely on a rotating validator-set key, the security question is less about cryptography than about who can trigger a rotation and what has to happen before a new key takes effect.

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